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The Means and Ends of Wellness Programs 
Abstract 
How far should we go in assigning individuals causal responsibility for their own health status and what 
should the implications of any such assignment be? 
Few would deny that most adults have a major role in achieving and maintaining their own health. 
However, it is not at all clear where one should draw the line between what is freely chosen and what is 
determined by forces outside a person’s control. Medical care plays only a small role in most people’s 
overall health, and often social, environmental, and personal factors are far more important. Incentivizing 
an individual to take better care of her health by adding incentives or penalties to her health coverage, 
even if done as reasonably as possible, may be far less effective than altering key social and 
environmental factors that are strongly linked to health status. 
Altering health coverage to include wellness incentives in an effort to manipulate individual behavior is a 
problematic trend. On the one hand, including such incentives ostensibly furthers the principle of 
distributive justice by encouraging individuals to take more responsibility for their health. But, on the other 
hand, such incentives not only misconstrue the purpose of coverage, but also arguably create an injustice 
by inappropriately elevating individual responsibility for health while ignoring the larger, systemic 
contributors to chronic diseases and conditions. Consequently, this injustice is harmful to all of us. 
Making access to health coverage contingent on health improvement efforts decreases access to health 
care services by making it more difficult or costly for individuals to obtain, retain, and use coverage, and 
inappropriately and disproportionately burdens the more vulnerable, without outweighing benefits. This 
practice focuses attention away from the larger causes of the problems, while blaming individuals for 
matters that are not completely within their control. 
This article will examine these issues as they manifest in private and public coverage in the form of 
employer-sponsored wellness programs and Medicaid personal responsibility requirements. Part I will 
examine the history and increasing devolution of responsibility for health onto individuals through 
changes in employer-sponsored wellness programs and personal responsibility requirements in Medicaid 
programs. Part II will examine ethical considerations regarding these changes. The article will conclude 
by showing that the degree to which we currently allocate responsibility for health onto individual 
behavior versus the government is ethically problematic and likely to lead to poor societal and financial 
outcomes. Individual choice has a role to play, but only in concert with collective legal action on larger 
policy issues. 
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BY: LAURA D. HERMER, J.D. LL.M.* 
How far should we go in assigning individuals causal responsibility for 
their own health status and what should the implications of any such assignment 
be? After all, it seems intuitive that each of us is best positioned to maintain our 
own health, best understands the consequences of not doing so, and should 
therefore be held accountable for it. Yet, as Professor Daniel Wikler observed 
many years ago, the merits of these assumptions are far from clear.1 It may be, 
he warned, “that the lack of a debate over the merits of assigning responsibility 
for health to the individual will lead to the uncritical and unhesitating adoption 
of the associated political and moral program.”2  
Thirty years later, we are seeing the fruit of this gradual and piecemeal 
adoption ripple through the sphere of health policy and into people’s everyday 
lives. Grocery shoppers and chain restaurant customers can choose to purchase 
reduced-calorie, gluten-free, or other “healthy” products. Consumers can buy 
devices or apps allowing them to track heart rate, personal sleep cycles, steps 
taken, etc.3 Smokers can choose a variety of implements intended to help them 
quit, from nicotine patches to vaping devices.4 Employers offer managed care 
plans and virtual primary care services, increase deductibles and cost-sharing 
amounts to shift health care expenses to employees, and institute programs 
intended to encourage improved employee wellness, among other changes.5 
© 2021 Laura D. Hermer, J.D., L.L.M. 
*Professor of Law, Mitchell Hamline School of Law. The author would like to
thank the participants in the 2019 Charm City Colloquium on Law and Bioethics 
for helpful comments on an early version of this article, and to the editors of this 
journal for their work and assistance.  
1. See Daniel Wikler, Who Should Be Blamed for Being Sick?, 14 HEALTH EDUC. Q. 11 (1987), 
reprinted in PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS: THEORY, POLICY, PRACTICE 89 (Ronald Bayer, Lawrence O. 
Gostin, Bruce Jennings et al., eds. 2007). 
2. Id. at 95.
3. See, e.g., Christian de Looper, The 10 Best Healthcare Apps, DIGITAL TRENDS (2019),
https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/best-health-apps/ (detailing features of particular fitness, diet, and 
other health apps available).  
4. Want to Quit Smoking? FDA-Approved Products Can Help, FDA (Dec. 12, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/want-quit-smoking-fda-approved-products-can-help 
(outlining available products to assist with such as nicotine replacement therapies and prescription 
smoking cessation medicines).  
5. See infra, Part II.A.
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Additionally, most states have embraced managed care plans in Medicaid for all 
but the frailest populations.6 Other states have sought with varying degrees of 
success to institute personal responsibility provisions to reward or punish health-
related or other behaviors exhibited by Medicaid beneficiaries.7  
Few would deny that most adults have a major role in achieving and 
maintaining their own health. However, it is not at all clear where one should 
draw the line between what is freely chosen and what is determined by forces 
outside a person’s control. For example, in some cases the financial ability to 
obtain or retain health insurance has become tied not just to financial factors, but 
to personal improvement efforts.8 An uncritical and outsized notion of the 
responsibility individuals have for their health underlies this trend. While health 
coverage can make it financially possible for people to access health care, 
coverage is not about improving health per se. Medical care plays only a small 
role in most people’s overall health, and often9 social, environmental, and 
personal factors are far more important.10 Incentivizing an individual to take 
better care of her health by adding incentives or penalties to her health coverage, 
even if done as reasonably as possible, may be far less effective than altering key 
social and environmental factors that are strongly linked to health status.11 
Altering health coverage to include wellness incentives in an effort to 
manipulate individual behavior is a problematic trend. On the one hand, 
including such incentives ostensibly furthers the principle of distributive justice 
by encouraging individuals to take more responsibility for their health. But, on 
the other hand, such incentives not only misconstrue the purpose of coverage, 
but also arguably create an injustice by inappropriately elevating individual 
6. See, e.g., State Health Facts, Medicaid Managed Care Penetration Rates by Eligibility Group,
KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/managed-care-penetration 
rates-by-eligibility-
group/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%
22%7D (showing that, in at least some states with substantial Medicaid managed care penetration, a 
smaller percentage of aged and disabled beneficiaries are enrolled in managed care than other Medicaid 
populations).  
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
9. See, e.g., J. Michael McGinnis, Pamela Williams-Russo, and James R. Knickman, The Case
For More Active Policy Attention To Health Promotion, 21 HEALTH AFFAIRS 78, 83 (2002) (stating that, 
“[o]ver the course of the twentieth century, about five of the thirty years of increased life expectancy 
could be attributable to better medical care”).  
10. See, e.g., Tiffany Fitzpatrick, Laura C. Rosella, Andrew Calzavara et al., Looking Beyond 
Education and Income: Socioeconomic Status Gradients Among Future High Cost Users of Health 
Care, 49 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 161, 163 (2015) (“In the unadjusted models …, [high cost users] 
were most strongly associated with low income and low household education. Strong gradients of 
association were noted for lower household income, higher area dependency, and lower ethnic 
concentration. After adjusting for age, these associations were attenuated, with the exception of home 
ownership and food security, which were strengthened…”). 
11. See infra Part III.
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responsibility for health while ignoring the larger, systemic contributors to 
chronic diseases and conditions. Consequently, this injustice is harmful to all of 
us. Making access to health coverage contingent on health improvement efforts 
decreases access to health care services by making it more difficult or costly for 
individuals to obtain, retain, and use coverage, and inappropriately and 
disproportionately burdens the more vulnerable, without outweighing benefits.12 
This practice focuses attention away from the larger causes of the problems, 
while blaming individuals for matters that are not completely within their 
control.  
This article will examine these issues as they manifest in private and public 
coverage in the form of employer-sponsored wellness programs and Medicaid 
personal responsibility requirements.13 Part I will examine the history and 
increasing devolution of responsibility for health onto individuals through 
changes in employer-sponsored wellness programs and personal responsibility 
requirements in Medicaid programs.14 Part II will examine ethical considerations 
regarding these changes.15 The article will conclude by showing that the degree 
to which we currently allocate responsibility for health onto individual behavior 
versus the government is ethically problematic and likely to lead to poor societal 
and financial outcomes. Individual choice has a role to play, but only in concert 
with collective legal action on larger policy issues.16 
PART I: CONTEXTUALIZING WORKPLACE WELLNESS PLANS AND MEDICAID 
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS 
The focus on personal responsibility for health in the context of health 
coverage predates the George W. Bush administration, but it sharpened during 
that presidency. When Bush first took office, he faced complementary problems 
with respect to health coverage. On the one hand, a growing percentage of 
Americans lacked health insurance,17 while at the same time health care costs 
and health coverage costs were rising.18 Neither President Bush nor the 107th and 
108th Congresses were inclined to address either issue through large, government 
12. See infra, notes 76–81, 108-111 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part I. 
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. ROBERT J. MILLS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, P60-215, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2000
(2001), http://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2001/demographics/p60-215.pdfplp. 
18. See Sherry Glied, Health Care Costs: On the Rise Again, 17 THE J. OF ECON. PERSP. 125
(2003). 
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solutions. Instead the administration focused on limited solutions that made use 
of the private market.19  
A number of strategies were employed to address the issue of rising health 
care costs, but one in particular became important for our purposes here: wellness 
programs. These are “program[s] of health promotion or disease prevention” that 
meet specific statutory requirements in an effort to make individuals healthier 
and, in the process, help keep down health care costs.20 Wellness programs 
generally must be devised to help individuals become or stay healthy.21 They 
may involve measures such as subsidized gym memberships, biometric 
screenings, health risk assessments, or structured programs to help people lose 
weight, exercise more, or stop smoking.22 The benefit of participation need not 
take the form of a reward, but may instead be the “absence of a surcharge.”23 
This strategy permits the entity providing coverage to charge more money to 
individuals who refuse to participate in particular kinds of wellness programs or 
who fail to meet the program requirements.24 
19. See Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, Pub L. No. 108-173, 177 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (providing the only significant reform to Medicare during 
that time). 
20. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(1)(A) (2012). See also CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,
Medicaid Incentives for the Prevention of Chronic Diseases Model, 
https://innovation.cms.gov/innovation-models/mipcd (providing grants to states under the Affordable 
Care Act to institute “comprehensive, evidence-based, widely available, and easily accessible” 
prevention programs to provide incentives to Medicaid beneficiaries who “demonstrate changes in 
health risk and outcomes, including the adoption of healthy behaviors”); Trump Administration 
Announces Opportunity for States to Participate in Wellness Program Demonstration Project, CTR. FOR 
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (Sept. 30, 2019), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/trump-administration-announces-opportunity-states-participate-wellness-program-
demonstration-project (describing an opportunity for up to 10 states to implement a wellness program 
for individuals purchasing coverage on the individual market).  
21. 42 U.S.C. §§300gg-4(j)(1)(A) (2012) (describing wellness programs as being offered by 
employers to promote health); § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B) (stating that wellness programs that require 
individuals to satisfy a requirement based on a health status factor “shall be reasonably designed to 
promote health or prevent disease. A program complies with the preceding sentence if the program has a 
reasonable chance of improving the health of, or preventing disease in, participating individuals and it is 
not overly burdensome, is not a subterfuge for discriminating based on a health status factor, and is not 
highly suspect in the method chosen to promote health or prevent disease.”).  
22. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1(f)(1)(ii), (iv), (v) (2019) (providing examples of participatory wellness
programs, activity-only wellness programs, and outcome-based wellness programs). 
23. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (2012). “A reward may be in the form of a discount or rebate of a
premium or contribution, a waiver of all or part of a cost-sharing mechanism (such as deductibles, 
copayments, or coinsurance), the absence of a surcharge, or the value of a benefit that would otherwise 
not be provided under the plan.” Id.  
24. 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802-1(f)(3)(iv) (2019). Individuals who cannot meet the requirements of a 
wellness program due to a medical condition must be provided a “reasonable alternate standard” to meet 
in order to obtain a reward. Id. 
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A. Employer-Sponsored Wellness Programs 
Employer-sponsored wellness programs have been in existence for quite 
some time, pre-dating the Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter “ADA”) 
of 1990. They started appearing in the 1970s as corporations sought ways to hold 
down employee health care costs, reduce absenteeism, improve morale, and 
increase productivity.25 These programs take two different forms. The first, 
“participatory” wellness programs, offer employees access to some program like 
a free or discounted gym membership, regardless of outcome.26 Such programs 
seek to prioritize “healthy” behaviors, but do so by offering carrots, not sticks. 
These programs are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis with no negative 
outcome for failing to participate. As such, they do not impinge on a person’s 
freedom or privacy, but instead increase an individual’s options. The second, 
“health-contingent” wellness programs, require participants to meet one or more 
health-related goals.27 If a participant meets their goal, then they either receive a 
reward or avoid incurring a penalty.28 Unlike participatory wellness programs, 
health-contingent wellness programs raise a number of problems, and are the 
subject of further discussion, below. 
The rising cost of health care in the 2000s, along with the carve out in the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (hereinafter 
“HIPAA”) for wellness programs, gave wellness programs a boost in the initial 
years of this century.29 In the 2000s, employers increasingly incentivized 
participation in these voluntary programs by providing, as permitted under 
HIPAA, either an incentive merely for participating in a non-health contingent 
wellness program, or up to a 20% discount on employee insurance premium costs 
to employees who meet a particular health goal in a health contingent wellness 
program.30 Between 2006 and 2009, for example, the percentage of employers 
25. Peter Conrad, Wellness in the Workplace: Potentials and Pitfalls of Work-Site Health 
Promotion, 65 MILBANK Q. 255, 257 (1987). 
26. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FAQS ABOUT AFFORDABLE CARE ACT IMPLEMENTATION PART V AND 




28. Id. For a list of some typical incentives and penalties that may be found in such wellness 
programs see, e.g., Bahaudin G. Mujtaba & Frank J. Cavico, Corporate Wellness Programs: 
Implementation Challenges in the Modern American Workplace, 1 INT. J. HEALTH POL’Y & MGMT. 193, 
196 (2013) (listing strategies such as offering free gym membership, reducing premiums for losing 
weight or lowering cholesterol, charging overweight employees and smokers a health premium 
surcharge, and charging a premium surcharge to employees who fail to obtain preventive healthcare). 
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3) (permitting employers to reward employees based on their 
achievement of particular health status factors in the context of permitted wellness programs). 
30. Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group Market, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 75014, 75017-18 (Dec. 13, 2006) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 146) (describing the incentive as 
exceptions to HIPAA’s strict nondiscrimination provisions to allow employers to provide rewards to 
employees for participation in wellness programs, regardless of outcome). 
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offering health plans who also offered a wellness program rose from 27% to 
74%.31
Wellness programs became increasingly well-established under the Obama 
administration and were boosted, at least in theory, from the Affordable Care 
Act’s (hereinafter “ACA”) expansion of the maximum possible premium 
discount that could be offered under HIPAA from 20% to 30% in the case of 
most health contingent wellness programs, or 50% in the case of smoking 
cessation wellness programs.32 By 2016, 83% of employers who offer health 
insurance also offered at least one wellness program, and 42% of large 
employers33 offering wellness programs offered a financial incentive to 
employees to participate.34 Fifty-three percent of large employers offered their 
employees the opportunity to complete a biometric screening measuring physical 
characteristics such as blood pressure, body-mass index, or cholesterol, and 
nearly 60% of those employers offered a financial reward to participating 
31. Kaiser Family Found., Employer Health Benefits, 2006 Annual Survey, Section12: Employer
Options and Health Management Programs, 1, 138 (2006), https://www.kff.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/7527.pdf; Kaiser Family Found., Employer Health Benefits, 2010 Annual 
Survey, Section 12: Wellness Programs, Health Risk Assessment, and Disease Management Programs, 
1, 170 (2010), https://www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/8085.pdf.  
32. Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed. Reg.
33158, 33159, 33167 (June 3, 2013) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 54). The expansion of incentive 
values may have had little practical effect in most employment settings, given how small most wellness 
plan incentives have been in relation to their potential maximum amount. An Employee Benefit 
Research Institute study included data showing that in 2014 of the large employers providing a financial 
incentive to complete a health risk assessment, 64% offered an incentive valued at $500 or less. Paul 
Fronstein and M. Christopher Roebuck, Financial Incentives, Workplace Wellness Program 
Participation, and Utilization of Health Care Services and Spending, 417 EBRI ISSUE BRIEF 4, 6, 8 
(2015).  RAND found in its 2012 Employer Survey that the median incentive value among employers 
offering an incentive was $300. Soeren Mattke et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Study: Final 
Report, RAND 1, 76 (2013), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR254/RAND_RR254.pdf. More 
recently, the 2019 Kaiser Employer Health Benefits Annual Survey found that 54% of large firms 
offering any incentive to complete a health promotion or screening program offered one with a value of 
$500 or less. Kaiser Family Found., 2019 Employer Health Benefits, Section 12: Health and Wellness 
Programs,  fig. 12.16 (2019), https://www.kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2019-section-12-health-and-
wellness-programs/. Only seven percent offered an incentive valued at $2,001 or more. Id. Incentives 
must be valued at more than $2,001 to approach the upper limits set by the ACA for an average-priced, 
employer sponsored, individual health insurance plan. See Kaiser Family Found., 2019 Employer Health 
Benefits, Section 1: Cost of Health Insurance, (2019), https://www.kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2019-
section-1-cost-of-health-insurance/ (finding the average cost of an employer-sponsored, individual plan 
was $7,188 in 2019); Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 
Fed. Reg. 33158-01, 33159, 3316760-33161 (June 3, 2013) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 54) 
(increasing the maximum premium discount to 30% of the total cost of employee-only coverage). 
33. HIPAA defines large employers as those “who employed an average of at least 51 employees 
on business days during the preceding calendar year and who employ[] at least 2 employees on the first 
day of the plan year.” 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91(e)(2). 
34. Kaiser Family Found., Employer Health Benefits, 2016 Annual Survey, Section 12: Health Risk 
Assessment, Biometrics Screening and Wellness Programs, 1, 212, 225 (2016), 
http://files.kff.org/attachment/Report-Employer-Health-Benefits-2016-Annual-Survey. 
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employees.35 Fifty-nine percent of large employers offered employees a health 
risk assessment tool, and 54% of those firms provided one or more incentives to 
help induce employees to utilize the tool.36 These percentages have changed little 
under the Trump administration. 37  
Despite the wide adoption of wellness programs by many employers, the 
evidence for the programs’ effectiveness is mixed at best. Numerous articles in 
the legal literature that examine the evidence on the effectiveness of wellness 
programs have found it wanting.38 Two recent studies bear remark. In contrast to 
35. Id. at 213. 
36. Id. at 212. 
37. See Kaiser Family Found., Employer Health Benefits, 2018 Annual Survey, Section 12: Health
and Wellness Programs (2018), http://files.kff.org/attachement/Report-Employer-Health-Benefits-
Annual-Survey-2018 (providing up to date data on health and wellness programs offered by employers). 
Approximately 82% of health insurance-offering employers also offered at least one wellness program 
in 2018. Id. at 189. Biometric screening was offered by 50% of large firms and of those 60% offered 
employees incentives to participate in the screening. Id. at 193. Sixty-two percent of large employers 
offered health risk assessments in 2018 and 51% of these employers also offered incentives to 
employees to participate in the assessments. Id.   
38. See, e.g., Lindsay F. Wiley, Access to Health Care as an Incentive for Healthy Behavior? An
Analysis of the ACA’s Personal Responsibility for Wellness Reforms, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 635, 665 
(2014) (finding that in 2014 “[e]valuation of the impact of these programs is limited. Only about half of 
employers who have wellness programs report that they have evaluated them”); Kristin Madison, 
Employer Wellness Incentives, The ACA, and the ADA: Reconciling Policy Objectives, 51 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 407, 415 (2015) (explaining that is unclear whether wellness incentives work, and “[a]s is the 
case for wellness programs in general, the answer is unclear”); Emily Koruda, More Carrot, Less Stick: 
Workplace Wellness Programs and the Discriminatory Impact of Financial and Health-Based 
Incentives, 36 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 131, 144-45 (2016) (noting, among other issues, that “many 
studies on the effectiveness of these programs run up against inherent flaws. Selection bias, for example, 
is a concern. In a study examining the overall health of individuals within a wellness program, if only 
the healthiest employees enrolled in the program, a comparison between participants and nonparticipants 
will likely be skewed to show more progress than is actually occurring. Other concerns with conducting 
studies include low response rates and publication biases” (citations omitted)); Elizabeth A. Brown, 
Workplace Wellness: Social Injustice, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 191, 213 (2017) (noting among 
other issues that “[w]riting in 2013, the [federal agencies charged with analyzing the final rule on 
Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs] noted that ‘currently, insufficient broad-based 
evidence makes it difficult to definitively assess the impact of workplace wellness programs on health 
outcomes and cost’” (citation omitted)); Adrianna McIntyre et al., The Dubious Empirical and Legal 
Foundations of Workplace Wellness Programs, 27 HEALTH MATRIX 59, 65, 73 (2017) (finding that 
several reasonably well-devised “studies that rigorously evaluate the experience of individual firms with 
wellness programs” and “several meta-analyses that have helped frame contemporary discussion around 
employer-based wellness initiatives” demonstrate that the programs have only “questionable efficacy”); 
Jessica L. Roberts & Leah R. Fowler, How Assuming Autonomy May Undermine Wellness Programs, 27 
HEALTH MATRIX 101, 111 (2017) (describing how “some of these programs have been described as 
poorly designed, haphazard, not evidence-based, inadequately resourced, not culturally supported, and 
ineffective”); Al Lewis, The Outcomes, Economics and Ethics of the Workplace Wellness Industry, 27 
HEALTH MATRIX 1, 13, 23-24, 36 (2017) (detailing the failure of wellness programs to reduce hospital 
admissions for conditions related to health behavior, the economic ineffectiveness of wellness programs, 
and problems with assertions of clinical effectiveness in the programs); Camila Strassle & Benjamin E. 
Berkman, Workplace Wellness Programs: Empirical Doubt, Legal Ambiguity, and Conceptual 
Confusion, 61 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1663, 1672-73 (2020) (“In short, the early evidence regarding 
wellness program effectiveness was fragmentary, poorly operationalized, and often observational, 
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most prior studies, both were randomized control trials.39 Both also found the 
wellness programs they studied to have little significant effect on employee 
behavior and health outcomes.40 
The first study – the Illinois Workplace Wellness Study – examined a 
wellness program implemented at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign.41 The study offered all 12,459 benefits-eligible employees at the 
university the opportunity to complete a baseline health and wellness survey in 
exchange for a $30 Amazon.com gift card.42  The 4,834 participants who 
completed the survey were provided with the chance to participate in the second 
part of the study.43 Of those 4,834 participants, 3,300 were randomly chosen to 
participate in the “treatment” group, whereas the remaining 1,534 were assigned 
to the control group and were not permitted to participate.44 All participants 
completed health surveys and underwent annual biometric screenings.45 
Members of the treatment group were offered monetary rewards to participate in 
the screening, health risk assessment (HRA), and periodic wellness activities 
ranging from $50 to $350 for the first year of the study and smaller rewards 
during the second year of the study.46 The researchers found no statistically 
significant effect of wellness program participation on health care spending, 
employee productivity, or employee health behaviors.47 Of the 42 outcome 
measures studied, only two yielded any statistically significant difference 
between participants and nonparticipants during the first year of the study period: 
(1) participants were more likely than nonparticipants to have had a health 
screening, and (2) participants were more likely than nonparticipants to believe 
that the management cared about their health and safety.48 
suggesting a surprisingly weak state of the science on program benefit,” and “[n]ewer studies further 
undermine the assumptions that policymakers drew from the earlier data”).  
39. Damon Jones et al., What Do Workplace Wellness Programs Do? Evidence from the Illinois
Workplace Wellness Study, Q. J. ECON. 1747, 1748-49 (2019); Zirui Song & Katherine Baicker, Effect of 
a Workplace Wellness Program on Employee Health and Economic Outcomes, 321 J. AM. MEDICAL 
ASS’N 1491, 1492 (2019). 
40. See infra notes 44-45, 53-56 and accompanying text. 
41. Jones, et al., supra note 39, at  1747 n.*.
42. Id. at 1754-56. 
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1756 (indicating that members of the control group were “notified they may be contacted
for follow-up surveys in the future,” and therefore any contact with this group was greatly reduced). 
45. Id. (noting that the first step of the program “included a biometric health screening and an
online [health risk assessment]”). 
46. Id. at 1757, 1785-86 (noting that rewards were decreased during the second year due to a
smaller budget and “the diminished effect of incentives on participation” during the first year). 
47. Id. at 1776-79. 
48. Id. at 1779. 
 
2021] THE MEANS AND ENDS OF WELLNESS PROGRAMS 235 
The second study, conducted by Zirui Song and Katherine Baicker, was a 
follow-up to their widely cited 2010 wellness program study.49 It examined a 
wellness program implemented at 20 randomly-selected BJ’s Wholesale Club 
worksites.50 An additional 20 randomly-selected BJ’s Wholesale Club worksites 
were selected as primary controls, and 120 remaining sites were secondary 
controls.51 The wellness program consisted of eight modules lasting four to eight 
weeks, covering health and wellness topics.52 Participants typically received a 
$25 BJ’s gift card for completion of a module, with overall potential incentives 
totaling $250 on average.53 At the treatment sites, 35.2% of employees 
completed at least one wellness program module, and 21.4% completed at least 
three.54 At the 18th month of the program, 25.8% of employees participated in 
the health assessment survey and 25.5% participated in the biometric screening.55 
Workers at treatment sites were 8.3% more likely than those at control sites to 
report engaging in physical exercise and 13.6% more likely to report engaging 
in active weight management, but otherwise reported few statistically significant 
differences in health behaviors.56 There were no statistically significant 
differences in clinical measures of health, health spending, or health care 
utilization between treatment and control groups.57 There was also no significant 
effect on absenteeism, work performance, or tenure.58 In short, both the BJ 
Wholesale Club study and the Illinois Workplace Wellness study found little 
impact for all the effort and expense involved.59 
Wellness programs nevertheless persist. In some cases, it may be that they 
offer a “feel good” strategy for raising employee morale, but other considerations 
may be at work. For example, HIPAA, as enacted in 1996, only obliquely 
addressed wellness programs.60 When the legislation that ultimately became 
HIPAA was introduced, the Senate bill sponsor described it as “build[ing] upon 
49. See generally Katherine Baicker et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Can Generate Savings, 
29 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1 (2010) (providing an overview of the 2010 study). 




54. Id. at 1495. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 1495-97. 
57. Id. at 1497-99. 
58. Id. at 1499. 
59. See id.; Jones et al., supra note 39. 
60. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 [hereinafter HIPAA], Pub. L. No.
104-191 § 2702(b)(2)(B), 110 Stat. 1936, 1961 (1996) (providing that, notwithstanding HIPAA’s 
protections charging different rates to similarly-situated enrollees in the same group health plan, the plan 
may nevertheless “establish[] premium discounts or rebates or modify[] otherwise applicable 
copayments or deductibles in return for adherence to programs of health promotion and disease 
prevention”). 
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and strengthen[ing] the private insurance market by making it easier for 
individuals and families to obtain health insurance coverage and to keep their 
coverage when they change jobs.”61 HIPAA’s portability provisions were a 
primary focus of the legislation, and in instituting group market protections for 
individuals with pre-existing conditions, the Act also substantially equalized 
costs and liabilities for employees, no matter what their health status might be.62 
The law did, however, permit employers to “establish[] premium discounts or 
rebates or modify[] otherwise applicable copayments or deductibles in return for 
adherence to programs of health promotion and disease prevention.”63 In 2006, 
regulations were ultimately promulgated to institute guardrails for workplace 
wellness programs in light of HIPAA’s nondiscrimination provisions.64 The 
regulations were intended in part to prohibit wellness programs from becoming 
a subterfuge for discrimination.65  
Nevertheless, permitting health-contingent wellness programs to exist, with 
their differential treatment of compliant and non-compliant employees, arguably 
allowed a certain degree of disparate treatment of employees based on health 
status.66 Health-contingent wellness programs can be intrusive and punitive, and 
61. Health Insurance Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1028 Before the S. Comm. On Labor and Human 
Resources, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) (statement of Sen. Nancy Landon Kassebaum, Chairman S. Comm. Of 
Labor and Human Resources).  
62. HIPAA § 2702(b)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §300gg-4(b)(1).
63. See HIPAA § 702(b)(2)(B) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b)(2)(B)); see also Interim Rules for 
Health Insurance Portability for Group Health Plans, 62 Fed. Reg. 16894, 16939, 16953, 16969 (Apr. 8, 
1997) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 144, 146). 
64. See Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group Market, 71
Fed. Reg. 75,014, 75,017 (Dec. 13, 2006) (to be codified at  26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 
C.F.R. pt. 146) (providing discussion on final rules promulgated to prohibit discrimination based on 
health factors). “The HIPAA nondiscrimination provisions do not prevent a plan or issuer from 
establishing discounts or rebates or modifying otherwise applicable copayments or deductibles in return 
for adherence to programs of health promotion and disease prevention. The 1997 interim rules refer to 
these programs as ‘bona fide wellness programs.’ In the preamble to the 1997 interim rules, the 
Departments invited comments on whether additional guidance was needed concerning, among other 
things, the permissible standards for determining bona fide wellness programs. The Departments also 
stated their intent to issue further regulations on the nondiscrimination requirements and that in no event 
would the Departments take any enforcement action against a plan or issuer that had sought to comply in 
good faith with section 9802 of the Code, section 702 of ERISA, and section 2702 of the PHS Act 
before the publication of additional guidance.” Id. at 75,017. 
65. Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group Market, 45 C.F.R.
§ 146.121(f)(3)(iii), § 146.121(f)(4)(iii). 
66. “The ‘reasonably designed’ requirement is intended to be an easy standard to satisfy. To make
this clear, the final regulations have added language providing that if a program has a reasonable chance 
of improving the health of participants and it is not overly burdensome, is not a subterfuge for 
discriminating based on a health factor, and is not highly suspect in the method chosen to promote health 
or prevent disease, it satisfies this standard. There does not need to be a scientific record that the method 
promotes wellness to satisfy this standard.” Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health 
Coverage in the Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,018 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 146) 
(demonstrating the ease in meeting the standard to be considered nondiscriminatory without scientific 
data to support the determination, which could leave room; see also Horwitz et al., infra note 72 at 474 
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the rules governing them can be contradictory or unclear. Employers have, for 
example, required participation in such wellness programs as a necessary 
condition for participating in the employer’s health plan,67 receiving employer 
contributions to premiums,68 and avoiding an insurance surcharge,69 among other 
matters. Some of those practices would likely no longer pass legal muster as a 
result of subsequent rulemaking.70 However, the contours of permitted 
requirements remain unsettled.71  
At the same time, the low participation rate for employees in health 
contingent wellness programs suggests that these wellness plans both can be and 
are being used as a means for employers to shift costs onto less healthy 
employees. In a review of studies of health contingent workplace wellness 
programs focusing on smoking, obesity, high cholesterol, and hypertension, 
(discussing the potential for wellness programs to be inefficient and even discriminatory if employers 
shifted costs onto certain employees). 
67. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Flambeau, 846 F.3d 941, 945 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(explaining a situation in which an employee’s health insurance was terminated after the employee 
failed to complete a health risk assessment). 
68. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Orion Energy Systems, 208 F.Supp.3d 989, 992 (E.D. 
Wisc. 2016) (discussing an employer that required employees to either complete a health risk 
assessment or pay the entire monthly premium). 
69. See Seff v. Broward Cty, 778 F.Supp.2d 1370, 1373 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (describing an employer 
that required employees to pay a $20 surcharge for not participating in the wellness program). 
70. The EEOC disavowed the Seff and Flambeau court’s excessively “expansive[]” use of the
ADA’s safe harbor provision in 2016 rulemaking: “The employers in Seff and Flambeau did not use 
wellness programs in a manner consistent with the application of the safe harbor provision. In neither 
Seff nor Flambeau did the employer or its health plan use wellness program data to determine 
insurability or to calculate insurance rates based on risks associated with certain conditions—the 
practices the safe harbor provision was intended to permit. Moreover, there is no evidence in either Seff 
or Flambeau that the decision to impose a surcharge or to exclude an employee from coverage under a 
health plan was based on actual risks that non-participating employees posed.” Regulations Under the 
Americans With Disabilities Act 81 Fed. Reg. 31126, 31131 (2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 
1630). Accordingly, the EEOC clarified that a wellness program will only be considered “voluntary” 
under the ADA if it, inter alia, “(i) Does not require employees to participate; (ii) Does not deny 
coverage under any of its group health plans or particular benefits packages within a group health plan 
for non-participation, or limit the extent of benefits… for employees who do not participate; (iii) Does 
not take any adverse employment action or retaliate against, interfere with, coerce, intimidate, or 
threaten employees within the meaning… of the ADA. . .” 26 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)(i)-(iii) (2018). 
71. See AARP v. EEOC, 267 F. Supp.3d 14, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (explaining the problematic 
nature of the term “voluntary” regarding wellness programs though discussion of its use in the GINA 
(Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act) rule). “EEOC’s explanation for its chosen interpretation of 
‘voluntary’ in the GINA rule fares no better than its explanation in the ADA rule—principally because 
EEOC relies primarily on its decision in the ADA rule as the basis for its decision here. Therefore, the 
Court again finds that the agency has failed to give a reasoned explanation for its decision to interpret 
the term voluntary to allow incentives of up to 30% of the cost of self-only coverage.” Id. EEOC 
subsequently vacated the portions of the ADA and GINA rules concerning maximum incentives 
permissible for wellness programs. Removal of Final ADA Wellness Rule Vacated by Court 83 Fed. 
Reg. 65296, 65296 (Dec. 20, 2018) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630); Removal of the Final GINA 
Wellness Rule Vacated by Court, 83 Fed. Reg. 65296, 65296 (Dec. 20, 2018) (to be codified at 29 
C.F.R. pt. 1635). 
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Professor Jill Horwitz and colleagues found little evidence that financial 
incentives encouraged employees to make lasting changes to their behavior.72 
Additionally, the studies offered mixed evidence on whether behavioral changes 
resulted in cost savings to the employer, therefore calling for more research to 
be done.73 The authors hypothesized that any savings may result from cost-
shifting onto noncompliant employees rather than from long-term improved 
employee health.74 No studies appear to exist that examine this issue, so there is 
no direct evidence to support or refute this point.75 However, as Horwitz and her 
colleagues briefly outline, and as ample other studies evidence, people with 
lower socioeconomic status are more likely than individuals with higher status 
to be obese, smoke, or have chronic health problems that might benefit from 
lifestyle changes.76 It would stand to reason, they suggest, that wellness programs 
would, in turn, disproportionately penalize such people.77 
There are surprisingly few studies examining the relative socioeconomic 
status of employees who participate successfully, participate unsuccessfully, or 
opt not to participate in health-contingent wellness programs with financial 
incentives. One of the few to do so involved a program implemented among 
public employees in Oregon.78 The program used the “play or pay” model, where 
employees who chose not to participate were charged $35 extra per month for 
72. See Jill Horwitz et al., Wellness Incentives in the Workplace: Cost Savings Through Cost 
Shifting to Unhealthy Workers, 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 468, 471-72 (2013). 
73. See id. at 469, 474. 
74. Id. at 473-74. 
75. Id. at 474. 
76. Id. at 473. See also Fred C. Pampel et al., Socioeconomic Disparities in Health Behaviors, 36
ANNUAL REV. SOCIOLOGY 349 (2010) (studying the relationship between socioeconomic status and 
health behaviors); Michelle Miller et al., Household Socioeconomic Status Modifies the Association 
Between Neighborhood SES and Obesity in a Nationally Representative Sample of First Grade Children 
in the United States, 20 PREVENTIVE MED. REPORTS 101207 (2020), 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211335520301662 (finding that children living in 
low-SES homes or low-SES neighborhoods had an increased incidence of obesity); MeLisa R. Creamer 
et al., Tobacco Product Use and Cessation Indicators Among Adults — United States, 2018, 68 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 1013, 1015 (2018) (finding tobacco use to be higher among 
people with a GED as compared to those with higher educational attainment and among those earning 
under $35,000 as compared to higher incomes).
77. Horowitz et al., supra note 72, at 474. “Our review found, at best, conflicting evidence that 
people with the conditions typically included in wellness pro-grams spend more on health care than 
others and, therefore, offer particularly attractive sources for cost reduction; respond to financial 
incentives with behavior changes; and thus improve their health. How can these findings be reconciled 
with claims that wellness programs have reduced employers’ costs? … [T]he evidence makes it quite 
plausible that employees with health risks are paying more for their care, subsidizing the healthy 
employees in the programs.” Id. 
78. Bill J. Wright et al., Does Skin in the Game Matter if You Aren’t Playing? Examining
Engagement in Oregon’s Public Employee Health Engagement Model, 31 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 
28, 29 (2017) (stating that socioeconomic status and other demographic and person characteristics were 
considered variables in the study). 
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their benefits.79 The 86% of employees who chose to participate had to complete 
a health risk assessment and take at least two online health education classes over 
the next year.80 Employees were less likely to participate in the program if they 
earned less than $40,000 per year, had a lower level of education, and/or had at 
least one health risk factor, such as obesity or smoking.81 Nonparticipants cited 
worries about the intrusiveness of the information they were asked to share 
(67%), problems with information security (40%), and potential adverse impact 
on their employment or pay (18%).82 The study did not examine the monetary 
effect on the employer or on participants. 
The Illinois Workplace Wellness Study, discussed earlier, also examined 
the socioeconomic status of individuals who participated versus non-
participants.83 Participating employees are less likely to either have high income 
or to be in the bottom quartile of income as compared to nonparticipating 
employees84 The share of participants who previously participated in a major 
local “running event is  8.9  percentage points larger than the share among 
nonparticipants.”85 Overall, the researchers observed that: 
Our results are broadly consistent with these concerns: participating 
employees are less likely to have very high medical spending, less 
likely to be in the bottom quartile of income, and more likely to engage 
in healthy physical activities. At the same time, participating 
employees are also less likely to have very low medical spending or 
have very high incomes, which suggests a more nuanced story.86  
Additionally, the Illinois Workplace Wellness Study had another finding 
relevant to an issue raised by Horwitz and colleagues.87 In the 13 months prior 
to the study, participating employees spent significantly less per month on health 
care – $115.30, on average  - than those who did not participate, although they 
were more likely prior to the study’s commencement to have nonzero medical 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 29-30. 
81. Id. at 30-31 (observing that employees who make more than $80,000 per year “were nearly
twice as likely to sign up” as employees who make less than $40,000 per year). The study also found 
that “more educated employees were more likely to sign up, whereas employees in predominantly ‘blue 
collar’ agencies (e.g., corrections and law enforcement) were among the least likely to participate.” Id. at 
32. 
82. Id. at 31. The authors noted that the “data suggest that employees sometimes feared that the
personal health information they were being asked to provide could place their certification, job, or 
salary at risk.” Id. at 32. 
83. Jones et al., supra note 39, at 1750 (examining evidence of employee “productivity,” which 
included variables such as sick leave, salary, promotions, hours worked, job satisfaction, and job 
search). 
84. Jones et al., supra note 39, at 1771. 
85. Jones et al., supra note 39, at 1770. 
86. Jones et al., supra note 39, at 1771. 
87. See Jones et al., supra note 41. 
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spending than nonparticipants.88 The researchers observed that, if wellness 
programs are a significant draw for employees similar to the participants in the 
study, then employers could realize a substantial reduction in health care costs 
by offering such a program in recruiting new employees.89 
B. Medicaid Personal Responsibility Provisions 
Just as in private coverage, personal responsibility provisions also creep 
into Medicaid.90 In the context of Medicaid, this trend had its genesis in the Bush 
administration, which sought to involve private entities to help address public 
problems.91 To address the issue of uninsured lower-income Americans, the 
Bush administration quickly sought to encourage states to partner with private 
entities, particularly private insurers, in expanding Medicaid coverage through § 
1115 waivers.92 During Bush’s first term, states seeking these Health Insurance 
Flexibility and Accountability (hereinafter “HIFA”) waivers did so with the 
stated goal of expanding coverage to populations who otherwise lacked it, with 
an emphasis on prioritizing public-private partnerships.93  
88. Jones et al., supra note 41, at 1767-69.
89. Jones et al., supra note 41, at 1772. The researchers further observed, however, that
participation in the wellness program had no significant effect on employee retention. Jones et al., supra 
note 33, at 1772. 
90. For examples of such provisions, see infra, note 99 and accompanying text (discussing, inter
alia, incentivizing beneficiaries to obtain preventive health services and, if unemployed, to obtain 
employment).  
91. See, e.g., HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., HEALTH INSURANCE FLEXIBILITY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY WAIVER INITIATIVE (2001), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20010821103242/http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/hifademo.htm (noting that 
the Bush administration would prioritize state approaches that used Medicaid and State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program funds to “maximize private health insurance coverage options” for low-
income Americans). 
92. Id. Section 1115 of the Social Security Act allows the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
at a state’s request, to waive certain federal requirements concerning Medicaid so that the state can test 
an experimental project that the Secretary believes will further Medicaid’s goals. 42 U.S.C. § 
1315(a)(1).  
93. HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., supra note 91. Between December of 2001 and December 
of 2006, only  fifteen states applied for and received such waivers and many of those states that obtained 
a waiver had few participants. Adam Atherly et al., The Effect of HIFA Waiver Expansions on 
Uninsurance Rates in Adult Populations, 47 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 939, 940–43 (2012), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3423173/pdf/hesr0047-0939.pdf (including data on 
enrollment in Table 1). Advocates for the poor were skeptical of the administration’s emphasis on 
private partnerships and some states’ attempts to make Medicaid coverage assume features of private 
coverage. See generally Edwin Park & Leighton Ku, Administration Medicaid and SCHIP Waiver 
Policy Encourages States to Scale Back Benefits Significantly and Increase Cost-Sharing for Low-
Income Beneficiaries, 8-10 (Aug. 15, 2001), https://www.cbpp.org/archiveSite/8-15-01health.pdf 
(noting that populations gaining coverage under HIFA waiver expansions may receive only limited 
benefits, and that governments may pay more to subsidize skimpier private plans than they would if they 
simply expanded Medicaid). Moreover, because of budget neutrality requirements and other constraints, 
the coverage offered to optional or expansion populations through HIFA coverage sometimes limited 
benefits and/or charged higher costs to beneficiaries. See Robin Rudowitz et al., A Look at § 1115 
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Even in the absence of such partnerships, however, the Bush administration 
was also open to Medicaid § 1115 waivers that sought merely to make the public 
program mimic certain features sometimes found in private coverage, such as 
wellness programs and flexible spending accounts, though often with more 
punitive effects.94 We first see states seeking to insert personal responsibility 
requirements into Medicaid with Florida’s “Medicaid Reform” § 1115 
Demonstration Waiver, and most notably later in the Healthy Indiana Plan 
waiver.95 The latter waiver included features such as a “Personal Wellness and 
Medicaid Demonstration Waivers under the ACA: A Focus on Childless Adults (2013), 
https://www.kff.org/report-section/section-1115-medicaid-demonstration-waivers-issue-
brief/#endnote_link_88161-5 (pointing out that “many of these [HIFA] waivers provided these adults 
more limited benefits and charged them higher cost sharing than otherwise allowed in Medicaid. 
Moreover, some of these waivers covered these adults through a premium assistance model that allowed 
the state to use Medicaid funds to subsidize the purchase of private insurance that did not meet 
minimum Medicaid benefit or cost sharing rules without requiring the state to supplement that coverage 
with wraparound benefits or cost sharing”). See also HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMIN., supra note 91 
(explaining the budget neutrality requirements of HIFA). Nevertheless, the program appears to have had 
at least some positive impact. For example, Adam Atherly and colleagues found that in the six states that 
implemented a HIFA waiver program with at least 1,000 general participants, “the probability of being 
insured increased by 6.4 percentage points between the preimplementation and postimplementation 
periods in the HIFA-eligible sample relative to the control groups.” Adam Atherly, Brian E. Dowd, 
Robert F. Coulam et al., The Effect of HIFA Waiver Expansions on Uninsurance Rates in Adult 
Populations, 47 HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 939, 946, 957 (2012). Notably, the study did not consider 
the nature or quality of the coverage gained in each program, which could be variable given the absence 
of benefit or other requirements that states had to meet in the coverage they offered to participants who 
were not otherwise eligible for Medicaid. Id. at 943 (highlighting the unique nature of each states’ 
program, making it impossible to identify effect of certain elements of the program. Quality may in 
many cases have been limited, given CMS’s budget neutrality requirement for § 1115 waivers, including 
HIFA waivers. See, e.g., MACPAC, Section 1115 Research and Demonstration Waivers, 
https://www.macpac.gov/subtopic/section-1115-research-and-demonstration-waivers/ (“Section 1115 
waivers are required to be budget-neutral, meaning that federal spending under the waiver cannot exceed 
what it would have been in absence of the waiver. Although not defined by federal statue or regulations, 
this requirement has been in practice for many years”). 
94. See generally Laura D. Hermer, Personal Responsibility: A Plausible Social Goal, but not for 
Medicaid Reform, 38 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 16, 17 (2008) (discussing measures the George W. 
Bush administration sought to promote in state Medicaid plans and § 1115 waivers).   
95. See CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, NO. 11-
W-00206/4, MEDICAID REFORM SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION (2006) [hereinafter Florida Section 
1115 Demonstration STCs], 
https://ahca.myflorida.com/medicaid/Policy_and_Quality/Policy/federal_authorities/federal_waivers/Ar
chive/waiver/pdfs/cms_special_terms_and_conditions.pdf (providing the Special Terms and Conditions 
(STCs) for the Florida Medicaid Reform §1115 Medicaid Demonstration which describes details on the 
nature of the program; CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, SPECIAL TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS, No. 11-W-00206/4, HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN (2008) [hereinafter Indiana Section 1115 
Demonstration STCs], https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-HIP/in-healthy-indiana-plan-stc-01012008-
12312012-amended-012010.pdf (providing the Special Terms and Conditions (STCs) for Indiana’s 
Healthy Indiana Plan §1115 Medicaid Demonstration  which describes details on the nature of the 
program). In Florida’s waiver approval STCs, “patient responsibility and empowerment” was cited as a 
key “principle of reform.” Florida Section 1115 Demonstration STCs at 1. CMS’s Special Terms and 
Conditions for the waiver noted that, under the waiver, beneficiaries will “be expected to take an active 
 
242 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 23:2 
Responsibility” (POWER) Account, to which certain beneficiaries had to 
contribute as a condition of maintaining benefits.96 The Special Terms and 
Conditions of that waiver, as granted by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (hereinafter “CMS”), identified the goals Indiana expected to achieve 
with the waiver – including “Prevention: Encourage individuals to stay healthy 
and seek preventive care” and “Personal Responsibility: Give individuals control 
of their health care decisions and incentivize positive health behaviors.”97 In 
approving this waiver, CMS apparently decided for the first time that prioritizing 
healthiness and personal responsibility ostensibly fell within the objectives of 
Medicaid.98   
The mainstreaming of emphasizing health and inserting personal 
responsibility requirements in Medicaid started in earnest with the Florida and 
Indiana waivers, but the worst excesses of these features were kept at least 
partially in check through the Bush administration’s apparent respect for § 
1115’s requirement to prioritize the goal of medical assistance in granting 
Medicaid waivers.99 Not until the Obama administration, ironically, did 
Medicaid personal responsibility requirements really take off.100 
CMS under the Obama administration was initially disinclined to grant § 
1115 waivers that did not hew closely to Medicaid’s purpose of providing 
medical assistance to qualified individuals and families. Many HIFA waivers 
role in their health care. Id. They will have the flexibility to choose from a variety of benefit packages 
and be able to choose the package that best meets their needs. Additionally, they will be rewarded for 
demonstrating healthy practices and personal responsibility.” Id. CMS did not, however, specifically 
identify these – or any other waiver feature, for that matter – as furthering the objectives of Medicaid 
generally. See id. (failing to discuss how these requirements advances the goals of Medicaid).  
96. Indiana Section 1115 Demonstration STCs, supra note 95, at 1-2.  Additionally, if a beneficiary 
regularly obtained certain preventive services, she could carry over unused balances in her “POWER” 
account from year to year. Id. at 23-24. 
97. Indiana Section 1115 Demonstration STCs, supra note 95, at 2-3. 
98. Indiana Section 1115 Demonstration STCs, supra note 95, at 2-3 (specifying that personal 
responsibility over health plays an important role in the program). CMS further noted in its initial 
approval letter that, “[w]ith the approval of this demonstration, CMS is permitting the State to test a 
model of health coverage that emphasizes private health insurance, personal responsibility, and 
‘ownership’ of health care.” Letter from Kerry Weems, Acting Adm’r, Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Serv., to E. Mitchell Roob, Sec’y, Indiana Family and Soc. Serv. Admin. (Dec. 14, 2007), 
https://www.in.gov/fssa/files/IN_-_Healthy_Indiana_Plan_(HIP).pdf. 
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2020) (permitting states to seek Medicaid demonstration waivers
which will promote the objectives of Medicaid; 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2020) (citing to Cindy Mann & 
Tim Westmoreland, Attending to Medicaid, 32 J.L., MED & ETHICS 416, 422 (2004) (stating that a chief 
purpose of Medicaid is to “furnish medical assistance”).  
 100. See, e.g., Robin Rudowitz et al., Medicaid Expansion Waivers: What Will We Learn?, Kaiser 
Family Found. (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-expansion-waivers-
what-will-we-learn/ (discussing “common features” of Medicaid expansion waivers such as “a 
“premium assistance” model, in which the state uses federal Medicaid funds to purchase Marketplace 
coverage for enrollees or other private coverage; enrollee premiums; elimination of the non-emergency 
medical transportation benefit, which is otherwise required under Medicaid; and use of “healthy 
behavior incentives” to reduce enrollee premiums and/or copayments”).  
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granted under the Bush administration met a quiet demise rather than being 
renewed during the first years of the Obama administration.101 But after NFIB v. 
Sebelius,102 which made the ACA’s expansion of Medicaid to all adults earning 
no more than 133% of the federal poverty level optional for states, CMS became 
more willing to grant waivers to states as quid pro quo in exchange for Medicaid 
expansion.103 In those cases, CMS justified the waivers on the ground of 
promoting “health” rather than expansion of coverage, although expansion was 
likely what CMS actually intended to promote.104 CMS appeared to favor more 
extensive coverage at some cost to the integrity and goals of the program, rather 
than no coverage at all.  
The Trump administration followed the Obama administration’s lead in 
using the ostensible rationale of health promotion to serve other purposes 
regarding Medicaid. However, the Trump administration went in quite a different 
direction. Rather than seeking to entice reluctant states to expand Medicaid 
coverage, the Trump administration instead cited health as an ostensible rationale 
for states to make non-elderly, non-disabled, adult Medicaid beneficiaries satisfy 
work requirements and other non-health related measures as a condition to retain 
Medicaid coverage.105 Early decision letters from CMS approving such 
requirements cited the benefits they would have on beneficiaries’ health and 
well-being. Such benefits allegedly range from “incentiviz[ing] uptake of 
preventive health services” to  “encourag[ing] beneficiaries to obtain 
employment and/or undertake other community engagement activities that 
research has shown to be correlated with improved health and wellness” and 
“provid[ing] incentives for responsible decision-making.”106 Described in this 
 101. See, e.g., Laura Hermer, On the Expansion of “Welfare” and “Health” under Medicaid, 9 ST. 
LOUIS UNIV. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 235, 241 (2016) (describing the Obama Administration’s actions to 
reduce the “arguable excess of Section 1115 waivers”). 
102. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 57 U.S. 517 (2012). 
 103. Hermer, supra note 101, at 242-43 (explaining that states would only agree to expand Medicaid 
if certain conditions were waived, such as the ability to institute personal responsibility requirements).  
104. See, e.g., CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, NO. 11-W-00245/5, HEALTHY 
MICHIGAN SECTION 1115 DEMONSTRATION SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, (2013) [hereinafter 
Michigan Section 1115 Demonstration STCs], 
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdhhs/Healthy_Michigan_Plan_2nd_Waiver_STCs_12_17_15_5
08663_7.pdf (listing among the demonstration’s goals, including to “[e]ncourag[e] individuals to seek 
preventive care and encourage the adoption of healthy behaviors”). 
 105. See, e.g., Letter from Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to State Medicaid Dir. (Jan. 11, 
2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/smd18002.pdf. “Today, CMS is 
committing to support state demonstrations that require eligible adult beneficiaries to engage in work or 
community engagement activities (e.g., skills training, education, job search, caregiving, volunteer 
service) in order to determine whether those requirements assist beneficiaries in obtaining sustainable 
employment or other productive community engagement and whether sustained employment or other 
productive community engagement leads to improved health outcomes.” Id. at 3. 
 106. Letter from Demitrios L. Kouzoukas, Principal Deputy Admin., Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Serv., to Steven B. Miller, Comm’r, Kentucky Cabinet for Health Servs. 3–4 (Jan. 12, 2018), 
https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
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way, CMS has argued that it may be an unfortunate side effect if some, or even 
many, lose coverage as a result of the requirements, but that it is simply part of 
the cost of encouraging Medicaid beneficiaries to become more responsible and 
self-sufficient and allowing states to more productively use scarce resources.107 
As discussed earlier in the context of wellness programs, the rationale 
underlying Medicaid waivers also matters. The Obama Medicaid expansion 
waivers, however much they opened the door to justifying waivers on invalid 
grounds, did indeed promote the provision of medical assistance.108 Without 
them, it is unlikely that a number of Republican-led states would have expanded 
Medicaid. However, obtaining agreement from states like Indiana, Michigan, 
and Iowa to expand Medicaid in exchange for permitting the states to curtail non-
emergency medical transportation or to lock out some beneficiaries from 
coverage if they failed to make required monthly contributions from their meager 
incomes or to take other punitive steps undermines the program’s purpose of 
extending medical assistance to qualifying populations.109 This is something we 
are certainly seeing now under the Trump administration. States ought not to 
hold their most vulnerable populations hostage to ideological priorities, and the 
federal government ought not to allow them to do this.  
The Trump administration’s rationale differs dramatically from that of the 
Obama administration. Under Trump, CMS seeks to use Medicaid, in many 
cases, like a temporary crutch to help support an individual who is learning to 
walk again.110 As the Trump administration would have it, one day, ideally 
Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ky/health/ky-health-cms-appvl-011218.pdf (approving Kentucky’s 
demonstration project). These rationales have remained relatively constant to date.  See, e.g., Letter from 
Seema Verma, Admin, Ctr. for Medicare and Medicaid Serv., to Nathan Checketts, Director, Utah Dep’t 
of Health (March 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/G5Z5-KYMH. (stating that “[w]ith approval of these 
amendments to the PCN demonstration, Utah and CMS will be able to evaluate the effectiveness of a 
policy that is designed to improve the health of Medicaid beneficiaries and promote their financial 
independence. Promoting beneficiary health and independence advances the objectives of the Medicaid 
program”). 
 107. See Letter from Seema Verma, Admin, Ctr. for Medicare and Medicaid Serv., to Nathan 
Checketts, supra note 106 at 9 (stating that “CMS acknowledges that some beneficiaries could lose 
coverage, at least temporarily, for failure to comply with the demonstration’s community engagement 
requirement. However, it furthers the Medicaid program’s objectives to allow states to seek innovative 
means of deploying their limited state resources in ways that may allow them to provide coverage to 
individuals beyond the statutory minimum…”).  
 108. See The Advisory Board, Where the States Stand on Medicaid Expansion (Jan. 13, 2020), 
https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/resources/primers/medicaidmap (noting the number of people 
who gained coverage in each state through the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, including the states that 
accomplished their expansion through a § 1115 waiver). 
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1(1). 
110. In a 2018 speech, CMS Administrator Seema Verma said,  
The problem too often is that the most well-meaning government policies trap people in a 
hopeless cycle of poverty, making it too difficult to escape, and too easy to become more 
dependent.  Instead, we ought to insist that the able-bodied participate in earning benefits. To 
quote from Arthur [Brook]’s book, The Conservative Heart: ’Work gives people something 
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sooner than later, the individual will be able to throw the crutch of Medicaid 
away and walk on his own. If she or he is unable to do so, the crutch may be 
removed.111 
PART II: SOME ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH WORKPLACE 
WELLNESS PLANS AND MEDICAID PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS 
The difference in the ends sought, respectively, by the Obama 
administration and the Trump administration matter: The Obama administration 
simply sought to encourage Medicaid expansion by states that would likely 
otherwise have refrained from doing so; the Trump administration, on the other 
hand, is seeking to both fundamentally change and diminish the program itself.112 
welfare never can. It’s a sense of self-worth and mastery, the feeling that we are in control of 
our lives. This is a source of abiding joy. There’s a reason that Aristotle wrote “happiness 
belongs to the self-sufficient.’ … It’s easier to give someone a card, it’s much harder to build 
a ladder to help people climb their way out of poverty. But even though it is harder, it’s the 
right thing to do.  
CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, Remarks by Administrator Seema Verma at the 2018 
Medicaid Managed Care Summit (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/speech-remarks-administrator-seema-verma-2018-medicaid-managed-care-summit. The Trump 
administration was more explicit in its Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in 
the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment in Stewart v. Azar, in which it defended Secretary Azar’s 
approval of Kentucky’s KY HEALTH Medicaid demonstration project: “Although plaintiffs call it a 
simple benefits cut, KY HEALTH is not designed to withdraw health insurance coverage from 
vulnerable people. Rather, it is designed (in part) to help people transition, or graduate, to commercial 
coverage.” Stewart v. Azar, Civil Action No. 1:18-cv -15, Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment 24 (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.192935/gov.uscourts.dcd.192935.51.1_1.pdf.  
 111. For example, CMS describes the community engagement requirement in the Healthy Indiana 
Plan as follows:  
Indiana will implement a community engagement requirement as a condition of eligibility for 
HIP beneficiaries, with exemptions for various groups, including: pregnant women, 
beneficiaries considered medically frail, members in active substance use disorder (SUD) 
treatment, and students. To remain eligible, non-exempt beneficiaries must complete a 
specific number of hours per week of community engagement activities, such as 
employment, education, job skills training, and community service for eight months in the 
12-month calendar year. Beneficiaries will have their eligibility suspended in the new 
calendar year for failure to demonstrate compliance with the community engagement 
requirement during the prior calendar year. During an eligibility suspension, beneficiaries 
may reactivate their eligibility in the month following notification to the state that they 
completed a calendar month of required hours. Indiana will provide good cause exemptions 
in certain circumstances for beneficiaries who cannot meet requirements.  
CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, No. 11-W-00296/5, 
HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN, 2 (2018) https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-
Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-indiana-plan-
cms-amend-appvl-02012018.pdf [hereinafter Healthy Indiana Plan STCs].   
 112. See e.g., CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, SMD 20-001, HEALTHY ADULT 
OPPORTUNITY, 1-3, 5-11, 16-25 (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.medicaid.gov/sites/default/files/Federal-
Policy-Guidance/Downloads/smd20001.pdf (inviting states to submit “Healthy Adult Opportunity” 
waiver applications that would cap a state’s federal Medicaid matching funds in exchange for substantial 
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But the means, in both cases, undermine the program. The purpose of Medicaid, 
as enacted, is to allow states as far as practicably possible to furnish medical 
assistance to certain qualifying individuals.113 Congress nowhere cited health 
improvement in describing the program’s purpose.114 Nevertheless, the Obama 
administration used this rationale in approving waivers sought by conservative 
states wanting to impose personal responsibility requirements as a condition of 
expanding Medicaid.115 The approval process for § 1115 waivers, especially 
prior to the ACA, has not been characterized as transparent.116 By unmooring the 
§ 1115 waiver process even further from its already amorphous and opaque
statutory roots, the Obama administration arguably made it easier for the Trump 
administration to justify its approval decisions.117 While CMS, under the Obama 
state flexibility to impose work requirements, change or limit benefits, impose cost-sharing, and change 
eligibility standards without seeking advance federal approval).  
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1. 
114. See id. 
115. See Michigan Section 1115 Demonstration STCs, supra note 104, at 3 (highlighting as a state 
goal to encourage “individuals to seek preventative care and encourage the adoption of healthy 
behaviors”); CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, No. 11-
W-00296/5, HEALTHY INDIANA PLAN 2.0, 2 (2015)  
https://secure.in.gov/fssa/hip/files/HIP_CMS_Approved_STC_Technical_Corrections_5.14.15.pdf 
(listing as a goal to encourage “healthy behaviors and appropriate care, including early intervention, 
prevention, and wellness”) [hereinafter Indiana Section 1115 Demonstration STCs 2.0]; CTR. FOR 
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, No. 11-W-00295, HEALTHY 
PENNSYLVANIA 2 (2014), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/pa/Healthy-Pennsylvania-Private-Coverage-Option-Demonstration/pa-
healthy-ca.pdf (noting that “With this demonstration Pennsylvania proposes to further the objectives of 
title XIX by … Encouraging healthy behaviors and appropriate care, including early intervention, 
prevention, and wellness”) [hereinafter Pennsylvania Section 1115 Demonstration STCs]; CTR. FOR 
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, No. 11-W-00275/9, 21-W-
00064/9, ARIZONA HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT SYSTEM—AHCCCS, A STATEWIDE APPROACH 
OF COST EFFECTIVE HEALTH CARE FINANCING 2 (2011) (observing that “[t]he demonstration will also 
test the extent to which health outcomes in the overall population are improved by expanding coverage 
to additional needy groups”) [hereinafter Arizona Section 1115 Demonstration STCs].   
 116. See, e.g., Sidney Watson, Out of the Black Box and into the Light: Using Section 1115 
Medicaid Waivers to Implement the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion, 15 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 213 (2015)  (highlighting issues of transparency within the Section 1115 Waiver 
process). “As the size and number of Section 1115 waivers have grown, so have concerns about the lack 
of transparency in the waiver approval process. Section 1115 Medicaid waiver requests have typically 
been negotiated behind closed doors: demonstration goals were often not clearly stated, the terms of the 
waivers were sometimes vague, and evaluations of demonstrations were often either not done, or not 
shared with the public or HHS.” Id. at 214-15. 
 117. For example, in its Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the 
alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment in Stewart v. Azar, the Department of Justice observed that 
“[t]he approval of these incentives hardly represents a sea change in the Administration’s position, as 
plaintiffs suggest. In its waiver application, the Commonwealth noted that ‘most of the features of 
Kentucky HEALTH’ had been approved in other State demonstrations …, and the results of the other 
demonstrations informed Kentucky’s project design. For example, during the last Administration, CMS 
approved a provision for suspension of coverage for Indiana’s demonstration known as HIP 2.0. … That 
project permitted the State to impose disenrollment and a non-eligibility period for beneficiaries with 
income over the federal poverty level who fail to pay their premiums, as an incentive to promote 
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administration, is hardly the primary entity responsible for the actions of CMS, 
under the Trump administration, the former must bear at least a small part of the 
blame for what has happened under the latter. Even an ethically “good” end 
should not be pursued using means that may be unlawful and that damage already 
tenuous norms.118  
There are consequences to shifting greater responsibility onto individuals 
for ensuring that the parameters of their lives are as healthy as possible. As others 
have noted, programs seeking to persuade or pressure individuals to take greater 
measures to improve their health carry real potential to unduly burden 
comparatively disadvantaged populations.119 Individuals with fewer resources 
often have diminished ability to affect their circumstances. It is not at all clear 
with respect to such programs where one should draw the line between what is 
freely chosen and what is determined by forces outside the participants’ control. 
Yet participants are penalized for both. 
Take, for example, Medicaid personal responsibility requirements. While 
states were largely prevented under the Obama administration from doing other 
than offering rewards for behaviors deemed by the state to be “healthy,” under 
the Trump administration states have unprecedented freedom to penalize 
beneficiaries or even take away their Medicaid coverage for failing to achieve 
certain health or “personal responsibility” goals implemented under certain state 
program compliance.” Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 110 
(internal citation omitted).  
 118. See, e.g., Stewart v. Azar, 366 F.Supp.3d 125, 131 (D.D.C. 2019) (discussing Kentucky’s 
pursuit of approval of a program that would likely cause “nearly 100,000 people to lose coverage,” 
threating to end coverage completely if the program was not approved). “Defendants urge the Court to 
adopt the proposition that the Secretary need not grapple with the coverage-loss implications of a state’s 
proposed project as long as it is accompanied by a threat that the state will de-expand – or, indeed, 
discontinue all of Medicaid. By definition, so this argument goes, any number of people covered by an 
experimental Medicaid program would be greater than the number if there were no Medicaid at all; as a 
result, any demonstration project that leaves any individual on a state’s Medicaid rolls promotes 
coverage. The Court cannot concur that the Medicaid Act leaves the Secretary so unconstrained, nor that 
the states are so armed to refashion the program Congress designed in any way they choose.” Id. 
 119. See, e.g., Wendy Mariner, The Affordable Care Act and Health Promotion: The Role of 
Insurance in Defining Responsibility for Health Risks and Costs, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 271, 325 (2012) 
(explaining that the target population for wellness program typically coincides with lower 
socioeconomic groups already burdened with higher prevalence of chronic diseases and other health 
concerns). “About half of those with disabilities who work earn poverty-level wages. While it might 
seem helpful to create financial incentives for them to reduce their health risks, they may be in the 
weakest position to do so. If these individuals do not succeed in qualifying for discounts or rewards, 
they will pay a larger share of their smaller income to obtain the same health insurance available to 
everyone else in the pool. In the worst case, they will not find employment at all, yet income can be a 
better predictor of health than the health factors that wellness programs seek to improve.” Id.; see also 
Jessica Roberts, Healthism and the Law of Employment Discrimination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 571, 607 
(2014) (arguing that “employer screens for health could disproportionally harm certain vulnerable 
populations, in particular racial and ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, and the poor and near-
poor by simultaneously restricting their access to wage work and to employer-provided benefits.”). 
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§ 1115 waivers.120 As just one example, this led in Arkansas to over 18,000
individuals losing their Medicaid coverage in 2018 because they failed to verify 
compliance with the state’s work requirement, which the state imposed on some 
beneficiaries as an ostensibly “healthy” behavior.121 It is unclear whether these 
individuals failed because they had no access to a computer in initial months to 
verify compliance, or because they did not know about or understand the 
requirement, or had limited opportunities available to them, or could work but 
simply did not want to do so. One study, however, found that more than 95% of 
the study population subject to the work requirements were either already 
meeting them or should have qualified for an exemption, and that nearly 35% 
had never even heard of the requirements.122  
Health-contingent wellness programs can create similar binds. They take a 
more paternalistic approach to personal health by offering benefits to - or 
imposing penalties upon - individuals based on their achievement, or lack 
thereof, of certain health goals, activities, or biometric indicators.123 One 
program, for example, gives employees the option of undergoing an annual 
biometric screening through a third-party vendor to measure factors such as body 
mass index, blood pressure, cholesterol and tobacco/nicotine use, using an online 
risk assessment, and participating in a variety of workplace fitness activities, or 
else be subject to a weekly health premium surcharge of $50.124 Such programs 
assume a causal connection between individual actions and measured outcomes 
and reward or penalize participants based on the results. Employers oftentimes 
describe a primary impetus for such programs as reducing health care costs, often 
 120. See, e.g., Healthy Indiana Plan STCs, supra note 111, at 23-24 (describing penalties, including 
disenrollment, for non-payment of POWER account contributions); CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND 
MEDICAID SERVICES, SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, No. 11-W-00293/5, WISCONSIN BADGERCARE 
REFORM, 23 (2018) https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/wi/wi-badgercare-reform-ca.pdf (describing how beneficiaries with a 
health risk behavior such as “excessive alcohol consumption, failure to engage in dietary, exercise, and 
other lifestyle (or “healthy”) behaviors in attempt to attain or maintain a healthy body weight, illicit drug 
use, failure to use a seatbelt, and tobacco use” who fail either to attest that they are actively managing 
their behavior or that they have a condition that causes them to engage in that behavior will be charged a 
full premium for coverage rather than a reduced one); CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, 
SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS, No. 11-W-00275/9, ARIZONA HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT 
SYSTEM, 27 (2019), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/az/az-hccc-ca.pdf (specifying disenrollment as a penalty for failing to 
pay a monthly “premium” to their medical spending account). 
 121. ARK. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., ARKANSAS WORKS PROGRAM 8 (2018), 
https://humanservices.arkansas.gov/images/uploads/011519_AWReport.pdf.   
 122. Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Medicaid Work Requirements in Arkansas: Tow-Year Impacts on 
Coverage, Employment, and Affordability of Care, 39 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1522, 1526, 1527 (2020). 
123. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
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by incentivizing healthy choices or disincentivizing unhealthy ones.125 Yet, as 
Professor Wikler observes, employees may have only limited freedom of choice 
in their ability to participate in such programs, depending on a host of 
circumstances.126 In cases where better health choices might be “less attractive 
than they should have been, morally speaking,” or where they are effectively 
unavailable, then the terms on which an individual makes an unhealthy choice 
may be unfair in a real, moral sense.127 Such individuals may be penalized not 
only in the constraints they may face in making such choices and the adverse 
health consequences that may result, but also in the penalties exacted through 
certain wellness programs.128  
At the same time that governments and employers are reallocating 
responsibility for health onto individuals, to the arguable detriment of the most 
disadvantaged among them, some of these same governments are making it more 
difficult for individuals to make healthy choices about basic conditions of their 
existence, such as the water they drink and the air they breathe.129 Before the 
government can hold individuals accountable for their own health, it needs to do 
its part to ensure the existence of necessary preconditions for living a healthy 
life. A person can exercise, eat a reasonable diet, and not smoke or drink, but if 
they live in a part of the country where oil refining facilities regularly vent 
 125. See, e.g., Dee Edington, Workplace Wellness Programs: a Win-Win Strategy, in U.S. CHAMBER 
OF COMMERCE, WINNING WITH WELLNESS 13, 13-15 (2019), 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/022436_labr_wellness_report_opt.pdf (discussing the 
benefits employers could see in reducing health care costs and providing several examples of several 
companies’ experiences). 
 126. See Wikler, supra note 1, at 99-101 (discussing whether various people truly do have the 
freedom to make lifestyle choices that will improve health).  
127. Wikler, supra note 1, at 101. 
128. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
129. See, e.g., Jim Malewitz & Kiah Collier, To Paxton’s Cheers, Court Blocks EPA Clean Water 
Rule, TEXAS TRIBUNE (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/10/09/paxtons-cheers-court-
blocks-epa-clean-water-rule/ (reporting a stay of the Obama-era Clean Water Rule in response to a 
challenge brought by Ohio, Texas and other states); see also Charles Piller, Exclusive: FDA 
Enforcement Actions Plummet Under Trump, SCIENCE MAGAZINE (Jul. 2, 2019), 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/07/exclusive-fda-enforcement-actions-plummet-under-trump 
(noting that FDA warning letters have fallen by one-third and that warnings from the FDA Center for 
Devices and Radiological Health dropped by more than two-thirds); Michael Hawthorne, Under Trump, 
the EPA Has Cut Back on Enforcement of Clean Water Laws in the Great Lakes Region, CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/environment/ct-trump-epa-great-lakes-
enforcement-decline-20200421-ddrijfviyrchpa2khe6za5d5m4-story.html (describing the substantial 
downturn in EPA enforcement actions under the Trump administration against plants that, for example, 
dumped carcinogenic or toxic substances into lakes and rivers); Richard Florida & Claire Tran, Where 
Americans Lack Running Water, Mapped, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Aug. 6, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-06/where-americans-lack-running-water-mapped 
(describing how “plumbing poverty is clearly linked to race and ethnicity,” and is also associated with 
poverty and renter rather than homeowner status); Bill Lindeke, Sidewalks Are Public Health, 
STREETS.MN (Apr. 20, 2020), https://streets.mn/2020/04/20/sidewalks-are-public-health/ (discussing the 
dangerousness and inadequacy of sidewalks in locations throughout the Twin Cities in Minnesota).  
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benzene and other pollutants above legal thresholds,130 or where steel mills dump 
carcinogenic metals into drinking water sources with relative impunity,131 they 
cannot be said to have full and meaningful responsibility for their health. To 
blame individuals for bad health outcomes under such circumstances is the 
antithesis of personal responsibility, in which individuals choose their own goals 
and accept the consequences.132  
While individuals are being penalized by making what employers or states 
consider to be poor health choices, many industries are largely free to market 
unhealthy products that are designed and produced with the specific goal of 
maximally enticing their use or consumption by these same people.133 We 
subsidize production of corn and soybeans134 – the primary ingredients for many 
calorie-laden but low-nutrient, highly-processed foods, among other items – but 
not, typically, vegetables and fruit.135 This policy choice has contributed to a 
 130. See, e.g., Kiah Collier, Report: Six Texas Oil Refineries Spewing Cancer-Causing Pollutant 
Above Federal Threshold, TEXAS TRIBUNE (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.texastribune.org/2020/02/06/six-
texas-oil-refineries-spewing-cancer-causing-pollutant-benzene/ (reporting that six refineries in Texas 
had concentrations of benzene over the legal threshold at their fence lines, including three in the 
Houston area). 
 131. See Hawthorne, supra note 129 (reporting that U.S. Steel “reported another spill of hexavalent 
chromium six months later, around the same time public interest lawyers dug up records documenting 
scores of other clean water violations at the northwest Indiana steel mill. Yet Trump appointees at the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency declined to punish the company, rebuffing career staff who 
confirmed U.S. Steel had repeatedly, and illegally, released harmful pollution into the region’s chief 
source of drinking water”). 
 132. See, e.g., Frank Nullmeier, Personal Responsibility and Its Contradictions in Terms, 3 GERMAN 
POL’Y STUDIES 386 (2006) (explaining government actions taken under the assumption it knows better 
than its citizens and denies people of personal responsibility). See also Daniel Wikler, Personal and 
Social Responsibility for Health, 16 ETHICS AND INT’L AFFAIRS 47, 50 (2002) (highlighting that “[t]he 
same freedom that permits us to act on our personal tastes and preferences, pursuant to our individual 
goals, plans, and values, reduces the scope of excuses for these choices should they turn out badly. Just 
as we expect to be left alone to decide which risks to take, others expect to hold us accountable for the 
consequences, and when they do, in this view, justice is served, not denied”). 
 133. See, e.g., ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN 
MEAL, 120-29 (2002) (describing the role of the flavor industry in creating products designed to 
maximally appeal to human taste); see also RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES 742-47 (1997) 
(describing how tobacco industry manipulated nicotine levels and availability in cigarettes). 
 134. See, e.g., United States Farm Subsidy Information, ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP  
(2018), https://farm.ewg.org/region.php?fips=00000&progcode=total&yr=2018 (showing that nearly 
half of the $18 billion in farm subsidies paid in 2018 subsidized the production of soybeans and corn); 
see also Caroline Franke et al., Agricultural Subsidies and the American Obesity Epidemic, 45 AM. J. 
PREVENTIVE MED. 330 (2013) (showing subsidy allocation in 2010). 
 135. See, e.g., CRS, The U.S. Trade Situation for Fruit and Vegetable Products 1 (2016), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34468.pdf (noting that, “[h]istorically, fruit and vegetable crops have not 
benefitted from the federal farm support programs traditionally included in the farm bill, compared to 
the long-standing support provided to the main program commodities (such as grains, oilseeds, cotton, 
sugar, and milk”); see also Franke et al., supra note 134, at 329 (noting that “[f]armers are penalized for 
growing ‘specialty crops’ (such as fruits and vegetables) if they have received federal farm payments to 
grow other crops. In other words, federal farm subsidies promote unsustainable agriculture while also 
failing to reward good stewardship. Further, although farmers may generate higher marketplace revenue 
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growing disparity between the comparatively cheap cost of commodity products 
and comparatively healthier fresh fruits and vegetables,136 to the arguable 
detriment of people’s health.137 States and private developers are relatively free 
in some jurisdictions to design communities in ways that ignore or foreclose 
reasonable opportunities for residents to exercise, associate easily and 
comfortably with one another in person, and enjoy peaceful, green spaces.138 If 
we want individuals to avoid indolence, gluttony, and misuse of intoxicating 
substances, why do we penalize them for such behaviors, while at the same time 
giving largely free rein to industries to promote that behavior? If we actually 
cared about the health and well-being of individuals, we would make it easier for 
them to buy and make healthy food, live in pleasant, reasonably safe, and well-
designed neighborhoods with plenty of opportunities for recreation, and foster 
vibrant communities where curiosity is encouraged and where people have 
multiple opportunities to connect and become involved, in an effort to build 
strong societies and improve mental health. But, we do not. We instead allow 
individuals to be treated as a means of maximizing profit, rather than as ends 
unto themselves. One can say that they are used as raw materials in commerce, 
and then punished when they behave as they are directed.  
This is not surprising, but still unacceptable. It is far easier to put the onus 
of health improvement on individuals, particularly impoverished or otherwise 
disadvantaged individuals, rather than addressing the underlying social 
determinants of health and structural inequalities that precipitate poor health.139 
With the current attention paid to prevention, linking health care and coverage to 
the state of being healthy seems almost natural. What is more, health care and 
coverage are perennially well-positioned to absorb ever-increasing spending 
from fresh produce, substantially lower economic security makes growing fruits and vegetables a risky 
proposition in an already risky industry”). But see Julian M. Alston et al., Farm Subsidies and Obesity in 
the United States: National Evidence and International Comparisons, 33 FOOD POL’Y 470 (2008) 
(finding that the farm programs, commodity prices, and the implications of farm policies have negligible 
impacts upon consumers dietary patterns and obesity). 
 136. See, e.g., Franke et al., supra note 134, at 331 (arguing that a “redesign of the subsidy system 
[to prioritize sustainable, biodiverse crops], rather than its elimination, is likely to yield more sustainable 
changes in the agricultural industry. Such revision could take the form of decoupling income supports 
from program-specific crops, and rewards for agricultural diversification”); see also Pablo Monsivais et 
al., The Risking Disparity in the Price of Healthful Foods, 35 FOOD POL’Y 514 (2010) (highlighting 
growing concerns with nutritional content of the American diet). 
 137. See, e.g., Franke et al., supra note 134, at 328 (arguing that “American farm policy is 
effectively driving the production and propagation of cheap sugars and oils that lead to widespread 
weight gain.”). 
 138. See, e.g., Andrew Chee Keng Lee et al., Value of Urban Green Spaces in Promoting Health 
Living and Wellbeing: Prospects for Planning, 8 RISK MGMT. AND HEALTH CARE POL’Y 131 (2015) 
(discussing the use of green spaces to combat obesity and mental illness). 
 139. See, e.g., Simon Szreter, The Population Health Approach in Historical Perspective, AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 421 (2003) (discussing historical perspectives of health systems along with the 
“resurgence of the population health approach [which] has developed from dissatisfaction with some of 
the limitations of a strongly individual-oriented methodology”). 
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because of their substantial subsidization by government. Health care provides 
an easy out for both government and society regarding health improvement. It is 
far easier to tell someone to take a pill or have a surgery than it is to either prevent 
or ameliorate their health problem by diminishing pollution and encouraging 
both exercise and healthier eating through structural changes in society.  
The outcome might be different if evidence demonstrated that imposing the 
burden of health improvement more heavily on individuals than on structural or 
societal elements yielded the best outcomes. If it were more effective and less 
expensive to focus efforts on individuals rather than to alter our regulation of 
certain industries, then it might be justifiable to require individuals to adhere to 
wellness programs or otherwise make efforts to demonstrate their personal 
responsibility for health as a condition of accessing benefits or obtaining them 
more cheaply.  
Unfortunately, no definitive evidence exists to support this. With respect to 
wellness programs, existing evidence suggests that such programs yield only 
limited, if any, benefits, regardless of whether one examines changes in health 
or reductions in overall health care costs.140 Evidence suggests that wellness 
 140. In the case of wellness requirements, participation rates among employees can be quite 
variable. On average, slightly less than half take advantage of a health risk assessment or other health 
screening if offered, but participation rates vary substantially from employer to employer. Soren Mattke 
et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Study: Final Report 36 (RAND 2013), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR254/RAND_RR254.pdf. 
Participation in health-contingent wellness programs is even less. Sixty-five percent of employer’s 
report that only 20% or fewer of their employees participate in any health-contingent program. Id. at 37. 
That percentage rises to 90% of employers with 20% or less participation in the case of weight or 
smoking management programs. Id. In a case study of five large employers (each having between 3,500 
and 65,000 employees) that RAND performed in 2009, one employer had participation from a 
substantial majority (86%) of its employees, however the other firms only recorded about 25% - 55% of 
their employees participating in any wellness program component, whether participatory or health-
contingent. Id. at 40. Adding a weekly $50 premium surcharge appeared to be the primary impetus for 
the increased participation at one case study workplace. Id. at 59. Exercise programs had a significant 
effect according to the RAND report. Participants added an extra 1.5 days per week during which they 
exercised at least 20 minutes per day. Id. at 44. The results were significant in the first and second years 
of the study, but not as strong thereafter. Id. Among smokers who participated in a workplace smoking 
cessation program, nearly 30% more stopped smoking in the first year than among non-participant 
smokers. Id. at 45. The effect continued, though at lesser rates, over time. Id. To put it in perspective, 33 
smokers at one of the participating case study employers quit smoking between 2011 and 2012, for a 
total reduction in the percentage of smokers at the firm of 1%. Id. at 46. Weight reduction studies had 
perhaps the least impact, although it was still statistically significant. The overweight or obese 
employees who participated in such a program (11% of such employees, on average, across the five 
employers) had a 0.15 point reduction in BMI in the first year of the program and less thereafter. This 
translated to less than one pound per woman who stood 5’4” and weighed 165 pounds, and nearly one 
pound per man who stood 5’9” and weighed 195 pounds. Id. at 47. While RAND found cost savings 
between participants and non-participants, the savings did not reach the level of statistical significance. 
Id. at 55-57. That being said, studies have found that employers who offer wellness plans do so 
primarily to reduce costs – their own costs. See, e.g., Nat’l Bus. Group on Health, Making Well-Being 
Work: Ninth Annual Employer-Sponsored Health and Well-Being Survey 1 (Fidelity Investments 2018), 
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programs may, at least in some cases, yield cost savings.141 However, as 
suggested earlier, these benefits may largely exist only for healthy employees 
participating in health-contingent wellness programs and their employers, and 
only because their costs may be shifted in part onto less healthy, often lower-
income employees.142 The evidence for the efficacy of personal responsibility 
programs in Medicaid is even more scant. Little evidence exists whether one 
considers relatively novel work requirements143 or longer-standing punitive 
measures regarding cost sharing, benefit reductions or lockout periods for 
failures to meet specific targets.144  
Placing an undue onus on individuals to make and keep themselves healthy, 
without adequate social and governmental support, is not only ethically unsound 
but also has little evidentiary support. It is time to end the current trend toward 
https://www.fidelity.com/bin-public/060_www_fidelity_com/documents/press-release/Fidelity-Well-
Being-Survey-041819.pdf (describing the incetive employers have to implement well-being programs). 
 141. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 125, at 14-15 (discussing return on 
investment for specific employers). 
 142. See Jill Horwitz et al., supra note 72, at 474 (explaining that the “review found, at best, 
conflicting evidence that people with the conditions typically included in wellness pro-grams spend 
more on health care than others and, therefore, offer particularly attractive sources for cost reduction; 
respond to financial incentives with behavior changes; and thus improve their health. How can these 
findings be reconciled with claims that wellness programs have reduced employers’ costs? … [T]he 
evidence makes it quite plausible that employees with health risks are paying more for their care, 
subsidizing the healthy employees in the programs.”). 
 143. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs, Arkansas Works Section 1115 Demonstration Waiver: 2018 
Annual Report 7, 12 (2019), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ar/Health-Care-Independence-Program-Private-Option/ar-works-annl-
rpt-jan-dec-2018.pdf; Arkansas’s Arkansas Works annual report stated that, out of the 38,321 
individuals subject to work requirements who were required to report their work activities, 4,353 failed 
to comply for three months and thus were disenrolled from the program. Id. See also Indiana Family & 
Soc. Servs. Admin., Learn about Gateway to Work, https://ismanet.org/ISMA/Resources/e-Reports/12-
5-18/HIP_members_will_learn_their_work_requirement_status_by_Dec_10.aspx (explaining that 
Indiana has also implemented an approved work requirement; however, it commenced in January2019 
and no data is yet available with respect to it).  
 144. See, e.g., Lewin Group, Healthy Indiana Plan 2.0: Power Account Contribution Assessment 1, 
7-8, 10-12 (2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-
Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-indiana-plan-support-20-
POWER-acct-cont-assesmnt-03312017.pdf (finding that, of the 590,315 HIP participants eligible to 
make a “POWER” account contribution in 2015-2016, and thus to enroll in or remain enrolled in HIP 
Plus, 55% failed to do so during that time period, resulting in their demotion to HIP Basic, their 
disenrollment, or their non-enrollment. The total included nearly 30% of those who earned 100% or 
more of the federal poverty level, and thus who could be either disenrolled or never enrolled in HIP as a 
result of failure to pay into their POWER account). Indiana paused implementation of its 6-month 
lockout policy in October, 2018. CMS, Medicaid Section 1115 Monitoring Report Indiana –Healthy 
Indiana PlanDY4 Annual Report 5 (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-
Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/in/Healthy-Indiana-Plan-2/in-healthy-
indiana-plan-support-20-annl-rpt-dy4-20190411.pdf. There were “no discernable patterns” in emergency 
department use between HIP beneficiaries who were directed to pay a higher copayment ($25 versus $8) 
for non-emergent use of the emergency department, and those who were charged a flat fee ($8) for any 
ED use. Lewin Group, at 32. 
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imposing personal responsibility requirements on individuals, and instead to 
share more broadly the burdens of creating healthy communities.  
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